Abstract
metric tons of cocaine and 23 metric tons of marijuana were seized by maritime forces in 2000, an estimated 568 metric tons of cocaine slipped through the transit zone -more than enough to meet the demand. Continued funding and dedication of already overtasked naval assets to this "war of attrition" does not appear, on the surface, to be warranted. However, further research at the strategic, operational and tactical level using a variety of measures of effectiveness showed this was not the case.
Based on the positive results, the evidence suggested that naval surface combatants make an irreplaceable contribution to the nation's goal to shield America's air, sea and land from the drug threat. These measurable results indicated not only that there is an effective presence with a high detection and monitoring rate of both air and maritime drug trafficking events, but the evidence also suggested that with increased interagency cooperation and continued focus on high-threat areas, the maritime STEEL WEB concept will eventually result in an overall reduced drug flow in the transit zone.
Introduction
The use of naval surface combatants and associated organic air assets in a law enforcement role in counter-drug operations is not effective and should be discontinued.
United States Code Title 10, Chapter 3, Section 124 specifically designated the Department of Defense (DOD) as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.
1 From a macroscopic view, although a record 60.2 metric tons of cocaine and 23 metric tons of marijuana were seized by maritime forces in 2000, an estimated 568 metric tons of cocaine slipped through the transit zone -more than enough to meet the demand. 2 This evidence suggests that there is a large hole in the "shield" established to protect the United States from the threat of drugs. Continued funding and dedication of already over-tasked naval assets to this "war of attrition" does not appear, on the surface, to be warranted. Further research at the strategic, operational and tactical level using a variety of measures of effectiveness, however, showed this was not the case. Continued improvements in operational employment are warranted, but it appears that naval surface combatants play a major role in maritime interdiction and significantly contribute to the overall national drug control strategy.
On the national strategic level, naval surface combatants play a major role in one of the five strategic goals published as part of the national drug control strategy in 1997.
Specifically, that goal is to shield America's air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat. The National Drug Control Strategy objectives that support this goal are to "conduct flexible operations to detect, disrupt, deter, and seize illegal drugs in transit to the United States and at U.S. borders; improve the coordination and effectiveness of U.S. 
Evaluation of Effectiveness
Due to the complexity of the problem, many factors can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of drug interdiction operations, including: (1) amounts of drugs seized; (2) fraction of interceptions or inspections that result in drug seizures; (3) fraction of drug shipments flowing in a conduit that are seized; (4) fraction of attempted drug shipments successfully flowing through a conduit; (5) smuggler's markup in drug price when using a conduit; and, (6) fraction of total drug market flowing through a conduit. 4 Assumptions made based on current trends in drug trafficking as well as the specific performance measures of effectiveness already selected by the Office of National Drug Control Policy We begin by admitting that it (drug control) really isn't a war. The "War on Drugs" is an unfortunate phrase because it conveys inaccurate ideas about the nature of the struggle and our efforts. Regardless of how successfully the national drug control strategy is implemented, we will grapple with drug control for the foreseeable future. Like the recovering alcoholic who never declares himself cured, our nation will never be able to pronounce the drug problem solved. It's not a war…And so we can dispense with the delusion that interdiction--which reduces supply by confiscating drugs in transit between producers and retailer--does not contribute to controlling the nation's drug problem. It does. Interdiction is not misguided. What is misguided is the notion that human ingenuity could create enough public education and treatment programs to create a culture that wouldn't consume an abundant supply of drugs that arrived on our shores unconstrained by a coordinated interdiction program. 8 Finally, in order to assess the ability of the maritime interdiction forces to meet the objective of conducting flexible operations to detect, disrupt, deter, and seize illegal drugs in transit to the United States, the "war" on drugs should be viewed as a campaign with a series of major operations, each of which has shown measurable results within the specific area of operations. Using these assumptions and specified measures, the following paragraphs show qualitative and quantitative results of maritime interdiction.
At the national strategic level, ONDCP estimated that in 1996 29% of cocaine enroute to the U.S was removed (165 metric tons removed/567 metric tons inbound). For 1997, 41% of cocaine en-route to the U.S. was removed (213 metric tons removed/524 metric tons inbound and for 1998 that 35% was removed (196 metric tons removed/553 metric tons inbound) as shown in Figure 1 .
9 These levels exceeded the national target and can be qualified as a success. The DOD has begun development of its own measures of effectiveness in response to criticism in a U.S. General Accounting Office report that stated that DOD has not developed performance measures for drug interdiction. 12 Although not yet published, The data showed that the interagency success in detecting and monitoring airborne cocaine trafficking events in the transit zone increased from 68% of known smuggling events in fiscal year 1995, when this data collection process started, to 91% in fiscal year 1999. The data also showed that the detection of known non-commercial maritime cocaine smuggling in the transit zone increased from 25% in fiscal year 1995 to 56% in fiscal year 1999. Of these detections, 17% of the airborne events and 41% of the maritime events were interdicted successfully by host nation and U.S. law enforcement agencies. Additionally, the DOD asserted that 100% of the detections were handed off to law enforcement agencies for interdiction. The reason for the disparity between detection and successful interdiction is that law enforcement capabilities cannot keep up with DOD detection and monitoring results. Earlier results from 1997 also supported this assertion.
Of 16 known events that occurred in 1997, there were three successful interdictions that resulted in seizure of approximately 22 metric tons. However, the Joint Interagency Task
Force -East (JIATF-E) had intelligence on five other events that were not interdicted, resulting in the successful delivery of 37 metric tons of cocaine. 
Gibraltar Royal Police Drug Interdiction -A Case Study
Although the previous evaluation is positive, there is certainly room for improvement. In an effort to make some concrete recommendations on how to increase the effectiveness of maritime interdiction efforts, a search was made for a case study
showing measurable results by law enforcement against maritime drug trafficking. The example chosen was the dramatic decline in drug trafficking and incidence of drug misuse activity in Gibraltar since 1994. The steady decline in drug supply and trafficking arrests shown in Figure 3 as well as the decrease in incidences of drug misuse shown in Figure 4 over those six years was significant and warranted analysis to determine the reasons for success. In order to put this study in perspective, some background information is provided. Gibraltar is a small country encompassing about 6.5 square kilometers, with a land boundary of 1.2 kilometers and a coastline of 12 kilometers with a territorial sea claim of three nautical miles. The country has a population of approximately 30,000.
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The land border is effectively closed to drug trafficking due to strict border controls and rigorous inspections. There is only one airport. The size of the police force (approximately 200 police officers), and the level of enforcement effort remained fairly constant over the period analyzed. Because of these factors, Gibraltar presents a very pure study in maritime interdiction efforts. The following paragraphs demonstrate some of the reasons that the national drug control policy of Gibraltar has been extremely successful.
One of the advantages is that the Gibraltar National Drug Control Strategy is very simple. Code-named OPERATION TRIANGLE, it consists of three main initiatives-Enforcement, Education and Awareness. The policing plan consists of six clearly defined objectives in three categories-Crime, Traffic and Public Reassurance.
With regard to illegal drug use and trafficking, the objective is to target the misuse of drugs and to promote awareness and prevention of drugs misuse among the community. Finally, and most importantly, in July 1995 the Gibraltar legislature passed an amendment to a 1986 imports and exports ordinance that prohibited importation of rigid inflatable boats of 6 meters or more in overall length or any adaptation of such a boat.
The objective of the legislation was to eliminate those boats that had a speed advantage over the Gibraltar Royal Police launches. These rigid inflatable boats were the Gibraltar drug trafficker's equivalent of the Columbian "go-fasts". Enforcement of the subject legislation resulted in the seizure of 65 such boats, giving a decisive, and irreversible advantage to the offensive efforts of the Gibraltar Royal Police in active maritime drug interdiction. 24 Instead of attempting to gain the advantage through improved technology in maritime interdiction capability, the Gibraltar government, in one fell swoop, eliminated the drug trafficker's long-standing advantage.
Opposition to Continued Use of Naval Surface Combatants
There are several opposing views to the use of naval surface combatants in a law enforcement role in counter-narcotics interdiction. The first, that interdiction is a war of attrition that the United States cannot win, was previously addressed. The other two primary objections to the continued allocation of naval surface combatants to this operations are: 1) Naval personnel assigned to surface combatants are not trained for a law enforcement mission and are prohibited by DOD policy from performing law enforcement functions; and, 2) Assignment to counter-narcotics operations results in a decreased training readiness of the ships involved because it draws them away from primary missions.
In response to the first concern, the Surface Warfare Officers School These teams are made up of nine highly trained law enforcement professionals. These teams also provide detailed briefings and training for the crews of naval surface units assigned to counter-narcotics interdiction.
To address the second concern, a survey was sent to a ship that recently returned from a successful counter-narcotics deployment. The ship was deployed for approximately five months to the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific. The ship's crew conducted a total of ninety-three queries of suspected vessels. Of these, nine vessels were boarded, resulting in three successful drug seizures totaling over 4.5 metric tons.
Overall, quantitatively (as measured by numerical M-rating), the ship's training readiness remained at the highest possible level in all warfare areas. In general, however, the ship operated in an independent steaming mode, and focused on training within the lifelines that required no outside assistance. The undersea warfare mission area was slightly degraded, mostly due to a lack of live submarine services. To compensate, the ship used available training assets to fill the void, including embedded onboard training devices, Air National Guard assets operating out of Aruba and Manta for air defense training and coordination with P-3 aircraft operating in support of counter-narcotics operations.
Qualitatively, the ship's leadership assessed that due to the relative isolation of the operations, the crew lost some proficiency at formation maneuvering, and surface and air contact management compared to operations within a battle group setting. However, these drawbacks are not unique to counter-narcotics operations and apply equally to many other operations not associated with battle group workups and deployments. 25 Additionally, by law (U.S. Code, Title 10, Chapter 18, Section 376), the military cannot provide support to civilian law enforcement agencies if it will adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States.
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Recommendations
Based on the overall evaluation of effectiveness, amplified by lessons learned from the Gibraltar Royal Police case study, the following recommendations are made to improve the overall effectiveness and employment of naval surface combatants in counter-narcotics operations: 1) Available forces should be allocated to meet counternarcotics functional plan requirements; 2) Several specific measures can be taken to improve the coverage afforded to detection and monitoring that can act as significant force multipliers; 3) A degree of simplification of the national drug control strategy and associated performance measures of effectiveness could result in improved effectiveness;
4) An objective should be added to reduce the tactical advantage of the drug traffickers by eliminating the "go-fasts"; and 5) Joint doctrine needs to be updated to reflect the current trends in maritime drug trafficking to ensure the correct threat is identified.
Assets are not being allocated to meet the needs of the unified commanders to support their counter-narcotics plans. In 1999, Commander, United States Southern
Command reported that the DOD was unable to meet 57% of the command's requests for assets to support detection and monitoring responsibilities. In 1997 and 1998, a successful maritime interdiction effort in the Eastern Pacific could not be pressed home because of a lack of available assets. 27 Evidence suggests that there is a close correlation between assets applied to maritime interdiction and drug seizures. For example, between fiscal years 1992 and 1995 total ship-days devoted to counter-narcotics operations declined from 4400 ship-days to 2800 ship-days (36% decline). Over that same period, drug seizures decreased from about 70,000 kilograms to 37,000 kilograms (47% decline). 28 Therefore, as national military priorities allow, available assets should be allocated to meet the established operational and functional counter-narcotics plans.
The next several recommendations deal with measures that could be used to fill the gaps in maritime detection and monitoring coverage and should be pursued. The national drug control strategy is extremely complex. There are five strategic goals, supported by thirty-one objectives and measured by ninety-seven performance targets. Many of the performance targets, such as to develop interagency drug flow models, identify and inventory intelligence and investigative interagency relationships, and develop and deploy over-the-horizon tracking technology, are one-time tasks as opposed to ongoing measures of effectiveness. 31 Simplification of the system for measuring effectiveness to focus on those targets that directly assess the reduction of drug supply and trafficking could result in more efficient and effective implementation at all levels.
An objective exists to research and develop new technology to reduce the supply of illegal drugs. The Coast Guard has obtained a number of fast speed deployable pursuit boats in order to counter the "go-fast" vessels. What is missing is an effort to reach agreements with host nations to enact Gibraltar-like legislation to outlaw, deregister and seize the "go-fasts", giving the advantage to the interdiction assets. This could obviate the perceived need for the United States to develop faster pursuit boats, and the unnecessary expense of the resulting "arms race" that may occur to develop technology to out run the "go-fasts".
Finally, joint doctrine is outdated and no longer reflects the current trends in drug trafficking. Several significant changes have occurred since the joint counter-drug operations doctrine was published in February 1998. Joint Pub 3-07.4, Chapter II, "General Threat" identified the major threat with respect to overall, worldwide production leaders; not with respect to those that specifically posed a direct threat to the United States. 32 Additionally, the relative importance of some threat areas has changed;
Columbia has overtaken Peru as the leading producer of cocaine and Afghanistan has risen to be the leading producer of heroine. The doctrine could be improved to focus more on those high threat areas that directly contribute to the drug flow into the United States. Columbia now supplies an overwhelming majority of the cocaine flowing into the United States by land and sea. Columbia and Mexico supply an overwhelming majority of the heroine and marijuana flowing into the United States by land and sea.
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Conclusion
Based on the positive results at all levels of the drug interdiction campaign, the evidence suggests that naval surface combatants make an irreplaceable contribution to the nation's goal to shield America's air, sea and land from the drug threat. These measurable results indicate not only that there is an effective presence with a very high detection and monitoring rate of both air and maritime drug trafficking events, but the evidence also suggests that with increased interagency cooperation and continued focus on high-threat areas, the maritime STEEL WEB concept will eventually result in an overall reduced drug flow in the transit zone. United States Naval surface combatants are, and will continue to be, the best command, control, communications, intelligence, and air and maritime surveillance platforms for conducting the maritime interdiction effort.
